

ROSS
TRUSTEES

Students' Union Superannuation Scheme

Susan Andrews

Chair of Trustees

4th March 2020



- 7% Issue
 - Issue
 - Process
 - Response
 - Impact
- Valuation
- Ongoing Actions

The Issue

← April 88	April 88 – Dec 93	Jan 94 →
------------	-------------------	----------

The Process

- NUS Consultation
- Compromise
- Advice

Response

- Impact
- Communication
- Non Consents / Non Responses

Costs

- The Pensions Regulator
- Friends Life

Reminder of the Process

Covenant Issues

- Challenges
- NUS
- Failure of Union

At Retirement Options

- Trivial Communications
- Pension Increase Exchange
- Transfer Values
- Buyouts

- BUFDG
- Disaffiliations
- Incorporation Window




SUSS Annual General Meeting 2020

Funding & Investment Strategy

Paul Hamilton &
Matt Tickle



The year at a glance




How have the assets fared?

Asset performance




Monitoring the strategy – the outcome for assets

Actual asset movements against expectations
(since the 2016 actuarial valuation)



Asset allocation as at 31 December 2019



Monitoring Implementation Performance Scorecard

	2017 Performance	2018 Performance	2019 Performance	3 year performance
Barings (absolute return)	Green	Red	Green	Green
Ruffer (absolute return)	Yellow	Red	Green	Red
Henderson (Bonds)	Green	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Legal & General (passive)	Green	Green	Green	Green
Standard Life (property)	Green	Red	Red	Red
Partners Fund	White	Green	Green	Green
Insight (LDI and bonds)	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Yellow

Changes to the Portfolio



December 2019

Insight

- › All holding in Bonds Plus 400 sold



Q2 2020

Aberdeen Standard

- › Property Fund to be sold



Q2 2020

Ruffer

- › Absolute Return Fund to be sold

Changes to the Portfolio

Environmental, Social and Governance considerations



Diversified Growth

- ❖ Replacing Ruffer with a less defensive DGF manager
- ❖ Reviewing ESG credentials of new Fund as part of the process



Property

- ❖ Reviewing options to increase allocation to illiquid assets with proceeds of Property Fund disinvestment
- ❖ Reviewing ESG credentials of the new Fund as part of the process



Equity Portfolio

- ❖ Reviewing the opportunity of using Legal & General's Future World funds
- ❖ Part of a wider strategy to increase the focus on ESG issues where appropriate and available

Actuarial Valuation

2019 Valuation Results

£m	2016	2019
Assets	101.3	119.1
Liabilities (no 7% issue)	221.0	235.2
Deficit	119.7	116.1
Funding Level	46%	51%
Cost of 7%		24.8
Actual deficit		140.9
Actual funding level		46%

If there were no 7% issue...

- Deficit would be reduced from £119.7m to £116.1m
- If recovery plan was on track, deficit should be £112.6m
- We are therefore 3% behind
 - This does include some benefit for reducing life expectancy allowance
- To keep same recovery plan end date would need an extra 3% from all
 - So an 8% increase in total
 - Current end date – 1 July 2033 (14 years)
- The Pensions Regulator working to reduce recovery periods
 - Currently 7 years on average
- Could have asked for a slightly higher increase and shortened the period?

Impact of 7% issue

- Original estimate of full cost of 7% issue was £47.8m
- True “full cost” was lower because:
 - We knew there was some caution in the estimate
 - Allowance for reduced life expectancy
 - We have done quite a lot of work to bring the number down
- Digging through the data has reduced the amount by around £2m
- Actual “full cost” of 7% exercise at valuation date would have been £33.5m

Compromise offer – scope for saving

- If everyone accepted the compromise offer, there would still be a cost of the 7% issue:
 - Not everyone was included (vulnerable, unable to contact)
 - Accepting compromise doesn't reduce cost to zero:
 - Pre 88 benefits get 7% either way
 - Pensioners get 7% to date
 - Give higher increases than original 3%
- Total scope for saving around £14m
 - Out of total of £33.5m

Compromise offer – what happened?


- Members affected: 643
- Members written to: 567 (88% of affected members)
- Response received: 482 (85% of those written to)
- Accepted compromise: 392 (69% of those written to)

- Impact of compromise offer has been to reduce cost of 7% issue by £8.7m
- Overall impact of 7% issue therefore £24.8m
 - (£33.5m less £8.7m)

Proposed impact on contributions

- Contributions allocated by liability, so unions affected by 7% issue bear the lion's share of the extra cost, BUT:
 - Not exact allocation
 - We do not keep track of "7% cost" as separate ring-fenced item
 - There is some cost for all in relation to orphans
 - We are planning to delay increasing contributions until 2021
- Starting point is 3% extra (so 8% total) increase in 2021
 - This is what unaffected unions pay
- Unions with members affected by 7% will see a higher increase in 2021
- Recovery plan end date extended to allow for "BUTs" above
 - (And to try to limit the impact on affected unions)

Proposed extra contributions from 2021 (on top of 5%)



What happens next

- Based on covenant analysis we hope contribution increases are manageable
 - Clearly some increases are large
- Delay to 2021 to give time to discuss with parent institutions
- Option to pay 3 years (from 2020) upfront again
 - Similar “discount” to last time
 - Exact amount will vary depending upon increase in 2021
- Will write to unions with their figures shortly
- Please let us know if increase is unmanageable
- Revised recovery plan end date 1 October 2035
 - 2 years and 3 months extra

Transfer values

Introduction

- Members can request a transfer of their benefits to another pension scheme
 - (Before retirement)
- Currently SUSS reduces the amount payable to reflect the underfunding in the scheme
 - Therefore no-one takes a transfer value
- Transfer values help the scheme
 - Reduced risk going forward
 - Reduction in deficit (even if unreduced transfer value paid)

Offering unreduced transfer values

- Trustees of SUSS could:
 - Offer unreduced transfer values
 - Highlight transfer value option to members in retirement illustrations
- Only really works if Unions pay the shortfall upfront
 - Maybe only works if institutions happy to bring forward funding for this
 - Similar in concept to paying deficit contributions upfront
- Not without its complications:
 - Ensuring members make good choices
 - What if some unions agree and others do not?

Extreme (?) example

- If all a hypothetical Union's deferred pensioners chose to take a transfer value:
 - Top up required: £760,000
 - Deficit contributions reduce by £55,000 per annum
 - Around £1m over 14 years (ignoring interest)
- We could prepare details for unions of what the impact for them might be
 - Not all would transfer at the same time
 - How many are approaching retirement
- Is there any appetite to look into this further

Questions & Answers
